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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES




The development of medical technology has enabled the medical pro-
fession to prolong life, using life-sustaining treatment, to an extent that
has never before been possible.' When life-sustaining treatment is the
only means by which one is kept alive, the individual confronts a choice
between continuing to live through the use of life-support and allowing
a natural death to occur.2 The freedom to choose to forego unwanted
medical treatment, however, is not an absolute right.3 The freedom
must be balanced against the state's interest in preserving the sanctity
of human life, as well as by other interests that the state considers
important.
The debate in the United States focuses on an individual's right to
forego unwanted life-sustaining treatment, or passive euthanasia. 5
More recently, a related debate in the United States has concentrated
* J. D. Candidate, May 1993. Washington College of Law, The American
University.
1. John L. Capone, Bartling v. Superior Court: The Final Transgression of A Pa-
tient's Right to Die?, 35 CAsE W. REs. 764, 764 (1985).
2. See infra notes 149-53, 165-67, 180-87, 190-91 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing cases involving an individual's choice to forego life-sustaining treatment).
3. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-54 (1990)
(explaining the countervailing state interest in preserving life).
4. James Bopp, Nutrition and Hydration for Patients: The Constitutional Aspects,
4 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 3, 22 (1988).
5. Mustafa D. Sayid, Note, Euthanasia: A Comparison of the Criminal Laws of
Germany, Switzerland and the United States, 6 B.C. IN't & Co~Np. L. REV. 533, 556
(1983). The term euthanasia derives from the Greek words "eu," meaning painless and
easy, and "thanatos," meaning death. Id. at 536. Black's Law Dictionary defines eutha-
nasia as an "act or practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from [an]
incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 554
(6th ed. 1990). The term "passive euthanasia" refers to the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment from a terminally-ill patient. See Sayid at 539 (defining passive
euthanasia).
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on active euthanasia.' Active euthanasia is defined as an individual's
wish to take active measures to end one's life when a grave illness has
caused pain and suffering. 7
While the controversy in the United States primarily centers on pas-
sive euthanasia, with active euthanasia recently becoming more widely
discussed, the debate in the Netherlands focuses largely on the issue of
active euthanasia.' Although euthanasia is technically illegal in the
Netherlands, no prosecutions result if certain guidelines are followed.'
This policy contrasts sharply with those of most other countries, where
active euthanasia is less tolerated.1" The implementation of this policy
6. See infra notes 208-34 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of active
euthanasia in the United States).
7. See Sayid, supra note 5, at 539 (defining active euthanasia as the affirmative act
of rendering a life-terminating agent). In addition to the distinction between active and
passive euthanasia, a distinction is also made between voluntary and involuntary eutha-
nasia. Id. at 536-37. Voluntary euthanasia involves consent by the patient or by the
patient's family speaking on behalf of the patient. Id. Involuntary euthanasia occurs
when the patient is unable to consent. Id. at 537.
In the United States, the active-passive distinction is irrelevant in determining an
individual's liability for involuntary euthanasia. Dana E. Hirsch, Note, Euthanasia: Is
It Murder or Mercy Killing? A Comparison of the Criminal Laws in the United
States, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 12 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821, 824
(1990). Involuntary euthanasia constitutes homicide because it involves the taking of
another's life against that person's will. Id. However, the active-passive distinction is
more important in an analysis of voluntary euthanasia. Id. While active euthanasia in
the United States is typically classified as murder, passive euthanasia is permitted in
most states. See id. at 824-26 n.22 (stating that the following states have held that a
patient may refuse medical treatment: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illi-
nois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey).
8. See infra notes 27-104 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of active
euthanasia in the Netherlands).
9. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1973, District Court Leeuwarden N.J. 1973, No.
183,(Neth.), reprinted in part in Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden-] 973, 3 ISSUES IN LAW
& MED. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Leeuwarden]; see infra notes 33-42 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Leeuwarden decision).
10. Ph. Schepens, Euthanasia: Our Own Future?, 3 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 371,
381 (1988). Traditionally, euthanasia has not been popular in Europe outside the
Netherlands. Id. This is due largely to the ethical codes of the national medical as-
sociations, which are strict in their opposition to euthanasia. Id. Although the Euro-
pean Code of Ethics represents an ambivalent view regarding euthanasia, the European
Community Medical Association and its Standing Committee strongly rejected efforts
by Dutch pro-euthanasia physicians who sought to gain European support. Id. at 381-
82.
Recent developments have reflected growing dissatisfaction with the ban on active
euthanasia. The European Parliament has adopted a resolution allowing doctors to
comply with the express and repeated requests of competent patients to end their lives.
What is the 'good death'?, THE ECONOMIST, July 20, 1991, at 21. The full Parliament
is to debate whether the proposal should become a directive for the countries of the
European Community. Id.
In England, euthanasia remains illegal despite attempts to enact enabling legislation.
See Peter Doherty, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, LAW AND JUSTICE 60, 63-65
(1983) (discussing the right to die in Great Britain). The British Parliament failed to
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has not been without problems.1 In some cases involuntary deaths have
enact the bills due largely to vague definitions of terms and administrative problems.
Id.; see also B. Sluyters, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 57 MEDtco-LEGAL J. 34, 34-
35 (1989) (discussing euthanasia in Great Britain and the Netherlands). The British
Medical Association has clearly condemned active euthanasia. Id.
The Penal Codes of Switzerland and Germany are unique in that they consider mo-
tive to be a key element in determining culpability. See Sayid, supra note 5, at 547
(discussing German and Swiss Penal Codes). These countries take into account the
actor's motive in determining the severity of the substantive crime and in sentencing
the individual. Id. Therefore, if applied to euthanasia, a court of law would look at the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the termination of life and not just at the act
itself. Id. at 548. These countries adhere to the theory that the motive for the criminal
conduct reflects the character of the actor, and, therefore, is a reliable indication of
whether the actor will repeat the criminal act. Id. at 549. Both the Codes of Switzer-
land and Germany mitigate the penalty of an individual who performs euthanasia if the
deceased requested death. Id. at 548-49.
Under the German Penal Code, one can be convicted of murder only if one commits
the killing with "base motives," which are construed as crimes committed out of greed,
lust for killing, or to satisfy a sexual urge. Id. at 550. Therefore, because a physician
who performs euthanasia presumably does so out of sympathy and desire to help others
ease their suffering, the physician would not be convicted for murder. Id. at 550-51.
Rather, the physician would be convicted as a "manslayer," which carries a much
shorter term. Id.
The Swiss Penal Code also places emphasis on motive. A "depraved mind" is consid-
ered a true indication of a murderer. Id. at 551. The Swiss Penal Code allows the court
to consider honorable motives directly in mitigating the sentence. Id. This is in contrast
to the German Penal Code, where an honorable motive is taken into account as an
extenuating circumstance. Id. at 552. Furthermore, both the Swiss and German Penal
Codes contain provisions allowing for mitigated sentences for homicides committed
upon request. Id. at 552-53.
Outside Europe, euthanasia has generally been viewed in a negative light. For exam-
ple, in Canada, the Criminal Code effectively makes euthanasia illegal. Fran Carnerie,
Euthanasia and Self Determinism: Is There a Charter Right to Die in Canada?, 32
MCGILL L.J. 300, 308-12 (1987). A constitutional debate has arisen as to whether the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees an implicit right to die. See id.
at 310-12 (arguing that the Charter implicitly guarantees an individual's right to ter-
minate life-sustaining treatment).
While surveys indicate that a majority of Chinese support the practice of euthanasia,
and while legislative proposals for its legalization have been presented, fear of abuse
resulting from legalization has curtailed its enactment into law. Mercy Killing Doctor
Awaits Judgment - China Debates, Reuters Library Report, Aug. 28, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Despite the illegal status of euthanasia, a court
in China decided its first case in May 1991, reaching a finding of not guilty in a mercy
killing, following four years of legal debate. Chinese Court Finds Mere) Killers Inno-
cent In Landmark Case, Reuters Library Report, May 8, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File. A physician administered lethal injections to a woman who
suffered from a painful illness, after her son requested the physician to do so to end her
misery. Id. Both the physician and the woman's son were found not guilty. Id.
The Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibetan Buddhism, has expressed the view that eu-
thanasia should be performed only when it is in the patient's best interest or when it
benefits "larger society." Dalai Lama Says Abortion. Euthanasia Sometimes Okay,
Reuters Library Report, Apr. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
11. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text (discussing the problems associ-
ated with loosely enforced provisions allowing active euthanasia).
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resulted where physicians have administered death-inducing drugs
without the individual's consent.12
Although one may contrast the United States' passive euthanasia de-
bate with the Dutch active euthanasia controversy, the distinction be-
tween passive and active euthanasia is one that some scholars argue is
illusory. 13 They assert that no substantive difference exists between pas-
sive and active euthanasia because both ultimately result in death.' 4
Thus, the logical corollary of allowing passive euthanasia is to permit
active euthanasia as well.
Perhaps more important than attempting to reconcile the difference
in Dutch and American debates is understanding that the entire eutha-
nasia controversy has a common underlying theme: the impact on an
individual's right of self-determination. In the Netherlands, the accept-
ance of active euthanasia recognizes an individual's right of self-deter-
mination. 15 In contrast, the illegal status of active euthanasia in the
United States"6 does not recognize such a right. When addressing pas-
sive euthanasia, many states acknowledge the role of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker in exercising an incompetent individual's right of self-deter-
mination. 7 The United States Supreme Court, however, has ruled that
a state may require a high evidentiary burden to demonstrate the indi-
vidual's own wishes prior to recognizing the authority of a surrogate
decisionmaker."8 Thus, an individual's right of self-determination is not
assured, even where passive euthanasia is permitted.
12. I. van der Sluis, The Practice of Euthanasia in The Netherlands, Lecture given
at Conference on Euthanasia and the Future of Medicine, Clark University, Worcester,
Massachusetts, Oct. 24-25, 1988, printed in 4 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 455, 460-61
(1988); see infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing euthanasia without
the individual's consent).
13. See Sayid, supra note 5, at 539-40 (stating that many commentators question
the distinction between active and passive euthanasia). Other scholars take the oppos-
ing view that a distinction should be made between an act and an omission to act. Id.
at 540. While passive euthanasia can be considered an omission to act (an omission to
maintain life-support), active euthanasia is an affirmative act of killing. Id.
However, one can also argue that the removal of life-support is itself an affirmative
act. Lynn T. Nerland, Note, A Cry For Help: A Comparison of Voluntary, Active
Euthanasia Law, 13 HASTINGS INT'L AND COMP. L. Rev. 115, 117 (1989).
14. See Sayid, supra note 5, at 539-40 (stating that there is no distinction between
active and passive euthanasia because the outcome is identical for both).
15. See infra notes 27, 62, 72 and accompanying text (describing the right of self-
determination recognized by courts in the Netherlands).
16. See infra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the illegal status of ac-
tive euthanasia in the United States).
17. See infra notes 180-92 and accompanying text (discussing state cases recogniz-
ing the authority of a surrogate decisionmaker).
18. See infra note 146-47 and accompanying text (describing the holding of a re-
cent Supreme Court decision).
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This note offers a comparison of the issues surrounding the right to
die debate in the United States and the Netherlands. Insofar as the
issues in both countries ultimately concern an individual's right of self-
determination, a comparison of the impact of euthanasia law on the
right of self-determination is merited. Part I examines the active eutha-
nasia movement in the Netherlands, focusing on the Dutch Penal Code,
case law, and euthanasia in practice.' 9 Part II explores the right to die
debate in the United States, with an analysis of case law and recent
legislation on the issue of passive euthanasia, and a survey of recent
developments surrounding the issue of active euthanasia. 0 With regard
to passive euthanasia, Part III proposes that an individual's right of
self-determination can be best maintained if family members or other
surrogate decisionmakers are permitted to exercise the patient's right
to refuse treatment when the individual is incompetent to do SO. 2 ' Part
III also suggests guidelines for legalizing active euthanasia. 22 The
Dutch experience serves as a useful basis for developing a system of
legalized active euthanasia. Legalization, however, need not give rise to
the types of abuses manifested in the Netherlands. Part III describes a
system through which abuses can be kept to a minimum while safe-
guarding an individual's right of self-determination.23
I. THE NETHERLANDS: LAXITY IN ENFORCING
GUIDELINES PERMITTING EUTHANASIA
A. THE DUTCH PENAL CODE AND THE FIRST EUTHANASIA CASE
In the Netherlands, many people adhere to the tenet that any type of
behavior is tolerated, provided that it does not harm another person.2
19. See infra notes 24-104 and accompanying text (examining active euthanasia in
the Netherlands).
20. See infra notes 105-234 and accompanying text (analyzing euthanasia issues in
the United States).
21. See infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (proposing that surrogate deci-
sionmakers should be able to exercise an incompetent individual's rights).
22. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text (proposing guidelines to mini-
mize abuses of legalized active euthanasia).
23. See infra notes 248-60 and accompanying text (describing a program for active
euthanasia).
24. See Peter Zisser, Note, Euthanasia and the Right to Die: Holland and the
United States Face The Dilemma, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INr'L & Co ,tp. L., 361, 363
(1988) (describing Dutch culture). Prostitution and drug use are among the types of
conduct that fall within the ambit of this concept. Id. The Dutch have traditionally
tolerated these activities, subject to certain guidelines. Id. Prostitution is limited to a
"red light" district in Amsterdam. Id. Drug use, although previously allowed in a par-
ticular geographic area in Amsterdam, has been further limited and monitored in re-
cent years. Id.
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The Dutch have adopted a cultural view that all problems ought to be
confronted openly, regardless of the inherent complications in doing
so.2 Furthermore, the Dutch have been inclined to incorporate the res-
olution of a problem into the law.26 The practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands, which is based on the right of self-determination,27 has
been approached in such a manner.28
The Dutch Penal Code, article 293, prohibits euthanasia;29 article
294 outlaws assisted suicide.30 Nevertheless, thousands of cases of eu-
thanasia occur annually in the Netherlands31 and the doctors who per-
25. Zisser, supra note 24, at 363.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 62, 72 and accompanying text (discussing Dutch case law per-
mitting the practice of euthanasia based on the right of self-determination).
28. Zisser, supra note 24, at 363.
29. Marian H.N. Driesse et al., Euthanasie en het recht in Nederland [Euthanasia
and the Law in the Netherlands], in OP LEVEN EN DOOD [A MATTER OF LIFE AND
DEATH], translated in part in Marian H.N. Driesse et al. Euthanasia and the Law in
the Netherlands, 3 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 385, 386 (1988) [hereinafter Driesse]. The
Dutch Penal Code describes euthanasia and its punishment as follows: "He who robs
another of life at his express and serious wish, is punished with a prison sentence of at
most twelve years or a fine of the fifth category." The fine consists of approximately
50,000 U.S. dollars. Id.
30. Driesse, supra note 29, at 385-86. Article 294 of the Dutch Penal Code pro-
vides a prison sentence for assisted suicide: "He who deliberately incites another to
suicide, assists him therein or provides him with the means, is punished, if the suicide
follows, with a sentence of at most three years or a fine of the fourth category." Id.
In the opinion of some scholars of the Dutch Penal Code, Articles 293 and 294
reflect the general climate of the late nineteenth century. Id. Charles Darwin developed
the theory of evolution in the middle of the nineteenth century, which gave rise shortly
thereafter to Social Darwinism. Id. This theory contemplated that man's interference
with natural selection caused the destruction of the human race. Id. During the period
in which the Dutch Penal Code was enacted, the suicide rate in Europe was high and
many expressed a wish to die. Id. Thus, the lawmakers, while recognizing the qualita-
tive distinction between murder and euthanasia, had as their objective the punishment
of blatant manifestations of disrespect for human life. Id. at 386-87.
31. See Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, 19 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 22, 22 (1989) (discussing estimates of instances of Dutch euthanasia).
No precise figure is available for the number of cases of voluntary, active euthanasia
performed annually. Id.
While general practitioners perform an estimated 5,000 cases each year, an esti-
mated 6,000-10,000 are performed by physicians in hospitals. Id. Some authorities,
however, have alluded to figures as high as 18,000-20,000 cases of euthanasia per year.
Id.
To illustrate the magnitude of euthanasia in the Netherlands, these cases account for
a significant portion of the approximate 120,000 deaths that occur annually. See C.I.
Dessaur & C.J.C. Rutenfrans, Mag De Dokter Doden? [May the Doctor Kill?] (Dr.
Walter Lagerwey trans., 1986), reprinted in part in C.I. Dessaur & Rutenfrans, The
Present Day Practice of Euthanasia, 3 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 399, 399 (1988) (dis-
cussing total deaths and total cases of euthanasia, both voluntary and involuntary in
the Netherlands).
Interestingly, 81 percent of Dutch general practitioners have performed active eutha-
nasia at least once during their careers. Fenigsen, supra at 22. Moreover, 28 percent of
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form them almost always go unprosecuted.3 2 In 1973, the Leeuwarden
District Court decided the first case dealing with euthanasia. 3 In that
case, a physician administered a fatal dose of morphine to her seventy-
eight year old mother who had been paralyzed by a stroke.3' The physi-
cian's mother had repeatedly expressed her wish to die.3 ' Although the
court convicted the physician, she was sentenced to just one week in
jail.3" The court ruled that active voluntary euthanasia is not a punish-
able offense if certain conditions are met.37 First, it must concern a
patient who is incurable because of illness or accident. 38 Second, the
patient must consider the suffering (either physical or spiritual) to be
intolerable. 3 Third, the patient must express in writing a wish to ter-
minate his or her life.40 Fourth, a physician must make a medical de-
termination that the dying phase has set in.4' Finally, the action must
be taken by or in consultation with the attending physician or
specialist. 42
The Leeuwarden Court held that if the patient satisfied the five con-
ditions, the doctor could administer life-shortening agents to alleviate
this group of doctors perform active euthanasia on two patients annually, and 14 per-
cent perform euthanasia on three to five patients annually. Id.
Active euthanasia ends the lives of 11.2 percent of Dutch AIDS patients. Id.
32. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 23 (stating that each year, public prosecutors
investigate only eleven of 5,000-20,000 euthanasia cases). The low rate of prosecution
is partially attributable to a high incidence of falsifying death certificates. See Barry A.
Bostrom, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the United States?, 4 IssuES iN
LAW & MED. 467, 482 (1985) (discussing reasons why so few cases of euthanasia are
actually prosecuted). The low prosecution rate is also a function of the difficulties that
arise when the Public Prosecutors are cast into the role of quasi-legislators, attempting
to determine whether the physicians acted within the guidelines of permissible euthana-
sia. Id.
33. Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 439. The judicial system in the Netherlands con-
sists of four levels. Zisser, supra note 24, at 365 n.53. First, the Cantonal Court adjudi-
cates minor offenses, including most civil cases. Id. There are sixty-two Cantonal
Courts, broken down geographically. Id. Second, the District Court adjudicates crimi-
nal cases involving felonies, civil cases outside the jurisdiction of the Cantonal Courts,
and all appeals from Cantonal Courts. Id. There are nineteen District Courts, each
overseeing three or four Cantons. Id. Third, five Courts of Appeals adjudicate appeals
from the District Courts. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court is the court of final resort and
decides only issues of law. Id.
34. Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 440-41.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 442.
37. See id. at 439 (describing five conditions required for euthanasia to be per-
formed legally).
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the patient's suffering. 3 The court, however, drew a distinction be-
tween medicine administered to relieve suffering, a side effect of which
is the death of the patient,4 and medicine administered in a large dose
for the purpose of inducing death.4 5 The court's decision proved to be
quite limiting;' 6 the doctor could prescribe medicine only to alleviate
suffering, although death would be the ultimate effect.47 Furthermore,
the court's guidelines required an incurable illness, a written request,
and a terminal condition.' Thus, although the court took initial steps
in allowing euthanasia, it greatly restricted the circumstances under
which it would be permitted. 9
B. CONDITIONS REQUIRED By SUBSEQUENT COURT DECISIONS
In all Dutch cases decided between 1973 and 1983, the courts de-
manded two conditions to allow euthanasia to be performed.50 First, the
request to die must be a product of the patient's free will. 5' Second, the
patient must consider the condition to be intolerable. 2 Some courts
added a third condition compelling the physician to confer with a col-
league. 3 Since 1984, the courts have standardized their criteria to in-
clude all three conditions.5
The Dutch Medical Association (Royal Netherlands Association for
the Promotion of Medicine (KNMG)), in cooperation with the Nurses'
Union, expanded and refined the judicial guidelines.55 Their guidelines





47. See id. (analyzing the effect of the court's ruling).
48. Id.
49. See id. (evaluating the effect of the Leeuwarden decision). In 1981, the District
Court in Rotterdam adopted criteria similar to those set forth by the court of Leeuwar-
den, but applied them instead to the crime of assisted suicide. Zisser, supra note 24, at
366.
50. M.A.M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316,
3317 (1989).
51. Id. The patient must initiate the request for euthanasia. Id. In addition, the
family cannot pressure the patient to request euthanasia, and the patient's requests
must be persistent and consistent. Id. A patient's mere wish to die is insufficient to
satisfy the required conditions. Id.
52. Id. A medical determination of the patient's suffering is required to avoid the
subjectivity inherent in the patient's own assessment of pain. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In addition, some courts have required other criteria, such as the existence
of an incurable disease or that the patient's death must not impose undue suffering on
others. Id.
55. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst
(KNMG) [The Royal Netherlands Association for the Promotion of Medicine] and
[VOL. 7:807
THE RIGHT TO DIE
require neither the patient to be near death due to a terminal illness,
nor the patient's wishes to be in writing.56 Therefore, the KNMG and
the Nurses' Union lack criteria that can be confirmed as a precaution
against abuses of euthanasia.57 One authority has noted, however, that
compared to certain legislative proposals for the performance of eutha-
nasia, the guidelines appear to be conservative in their requirements. 8
Some legislative proposals for legalizing euthanasia have advocated a
more liberal approach in allowing euthanasia than have the Dutch
Medical Association guidelines. 9
C. RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS
In 1984, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands heard its first case
on euthanasia.6" The Alkmaar District Court had acquitted a doctor
who terminated the life of an elderly patient who had requested
death.6 In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on the pa-
Het Beterschap belangenvereniging voor verpleegkundigen en verzorgenden (Recovery,
Interest Association of Nurses and Nursing Aids], reprinted in Guidelines For Eutha-
nasia, 3 IssueS IN LAW & MED. 429, 431-33 (1988). The guidelines established by the
KNMG and the Nurses' Union require five elements. First, the request for euthanasia
must be voluntary and must be made by a patient competent to articulate his or her
wishes. Id. Second, the request must be well-considered and alternative options must be
examined. Id. Third, the patient must persistently express a wish to die. Id. Fourth, the
patient must experience "persistent, unbearable, and hopeless" suffering. Id. Fifth, the
doctor must consult with at least one other doctor regarding the patient's request to
terminate life. Id.
56. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 472 (examining the guidelines proposed by the
Dutch Medical Association and the Nurses' Union).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (describing alternative proposals for legalizing euthanasia). For exam-
ple, the General Health Council issued a "Proposal of Advice Concerning Carefulness
Requirements In The Performance of Euthanasia." Id. at 472. This proposal presented
the following guidelines: (1) the doctor must notify the patient of the diagnosis and
possible medical treatments; (2) both the doctor and the patient must understand the
request for death to be voluntary; (3) the doctor may perform euthanasia on an incom-
petent patient if the patient had previously prepared a written request; (4) the doctor
must discuss the situation with a colleague; (5) the doctor must keep a record of the
case for five years; (6) if the patient is under sixteen years of age, euthanasia may be
performed without parental consent if the minor asserts a valid objection to the doctor
notifying them. Id. at 472-73.
This far-reaching proposal allows euthanasia to be performed on individuals who are
not terminally ill, those who are incapable of making a decision regarding their health,
and those who are under sixteen years of age without parental approval. See id. at 473
(interpreting the proposal of the General Health Council). Moreover, the proposal does
not require intolerable suffering or imminent death. Id.
60. J.K.M. Gevers, Legal Developments Concerning Active Euthanasia On Re-
quest in the Netherlands, I BioErtncs 156, 159 (1987).
61. Feber, De wederwaardigheden van artikel 293 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht
vanaf 1981 tot heden [The Vicissitudes of Article 293 of the Penal Code from 1981 to
1992]
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tient's right of self-determination. 62 On appeal, the Amsterdam Court
of Appeals reversed the Alkmaar decision and found the doctor guilty,
but set no punishment.63
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands vacated the decision by the
Amsterdam Court of Appeals, stating that the latter had failed to ex-
amine whether an emergency existed according to conscientious medi-
cal opinion under the current guidelines of medical ethics.6" The Su-
preme Court then referred the case to the High Court of the Hague. 0
In doing so, the Supreme Court requested that the High Court of the
Hague assess whether euthanasia may be considered legal in a situation
of necessity, based on an "objective medical perspective. '6' The High
Court of the Hague gave its judgment in 1986 and acquitted the doc-
tor.67 In assessing the instructions by the Supreme Court, it held that
euthanasia may be justified if the patient is in dire distress68 and wishes
to "die with dignity."6 In reaching its decision, however, the Court
substituted the term "reasonable medical insight" for "objective medi-
cal perspective," the term used by the Supreme Court. 70
According to the Advocate General at the Court of Justice in The
Hague, the court decision expands the group of individuals who can
undergo euthanasia by requiring that a patient must wish to "die with
dignity."' 7' "Dying with dignity" is a determination made by the pa-
tient, thus recognizing the patient's right of self-determination. 72 The
Advocate General expressed fear that the decision would lead to wide-
the Present], in Euthanasie Knelpunten In Een Discussie [Euthanasia: Bottlenecks in
a Discussion] 54-81, reviewed in Abstracts, 3 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 455, 456 (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 457.
64. Id. at 457-58.
65. Id. at 458.
66. See id. (discussing the issues that the Supreme Court requested the High Court
of the Hague to address).
67. Id. at 462.
68. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1986, High Court (Penal Chamber) N.J. 1987, no. 607
(Neth.), reviewed in Nota Bene, The High Court of the Hague, Case No. 79065, Oct.
21, 1986, 3 ISSUES IN LAW AND MED. 445 (1988). See also Barry Bostrom & Walter
Lagerway, Court of the Hague (Penal Chamber) Apr. 2, 1987, 3 ISSUES IN LAW AND
MED. 451, 451-52 (1988)(stating that in a later case, the Court held that when death
results from active euthanasia, the death certificate cannot state natural cause as the
cause of death). The Court reasoned that if euthanasia is to be practiced, it must be
done openly, in order to facilitate investigations if necessary. Id.
69. See Feber, supra note 61, at 461-63 (discussing the decision by the High Court
of The Hague).
70. Id.; see also infra note 75 and accompanying text (comparing the reasonable
and objective standards).
71. See id. at 461 (analyzing the effect of the court's ruling).
72. Id. at 461-63.
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spread occurrences of euthanasia." In his opinion, the ruling produces
a flexible standard that could result in a more widespread practice of
euthanasia.74 By adopting the standard that euthanasia should be per-
formed using "reasonable" rather than "objective" medical insight,
what is deemed "reasonable" is somewhat subjective and may vary
among medical experts.7
D. DUTCH EUTHANASIA IN PRACTICE
Dutch case law provides that if physicians act within the guidelines
set by the courts, they will not be prosecuted despite the Penal Code's
sanction on euthanasia.7 1 It must be reiterated, however, that in actual
practice very few doctors are prosecuted regardless of whether the
guidelines are strictly followed." Although the courts have taken a
fairly liberal stance by allowing euthanasia under certain circum-
stances, the Penal Code directly conflicts with the courts' tolerance of
euthanasia.7 s
Several groups have unsuccessfully attempted to change the Penal
Code to bring it into compliance with the actual practice of euthana-
sia.7 9 For example, several government officials, as well as the Royal
Netherlands Association for the Promotion of Medicine (KNMG) and
the Nurses' Union, have tried to legalize euthanasia. 8 Despite the lack
of formal legislation, however, euthanasia is a generally accepted prac-
73. See id. at 461 (expressing Feber's fear that euthanasia will become extensive).
Feber worries that if courts in the Netherlands allow euthanasia in cases of mental
anguish, it will greatly increase the number of euthanasia cases. Id. This is particularly
likely because the courts have generally remained conservative in the face of growing
public acceptance of euthanasia. Id.
74. Id. at 462-63.
75. See id. (discussing the implications of the decision by the High Court of The
Hague).
76. See supra notes 37-42, 50-57 and accompanying text (examining the judicially-
imposed guidelines and those of the KNMG).
77. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 23 (noting the limited prosecution of euthana-
sia in the Netherlands). Despite the occurrence of 5,000 to 20,000 cases of euthanasia
annually, public prosecutors investigate approximately eleven cases per year. Id.
78. See supra notes 29-30, 37 and accompanying text (discussing the Dutch Penal
Code and the Leeuwarden decision setting forth guidelines under which euthanasia is
permitted).
79. See Schepens, supra note 10, at 374-76 (discussing efrorts to legalize euthana-
sia in the Netherlands).
80. Id. In 1984, a member of Parliament unsuccessfully introduced a bill that
would legalize euthanasia. Id. at 375. In 1985, the State Commission on Euthanasia
recommended changing the Penal Code to provide that a doctor who practiced eutha-
nasia should not be punished if certain conditions were met. Id. In addition, the Dutch
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Well-Being, Public Health and Culture sent a
letter with a draft bill to the President of the Lower Chamber of Parliament. Id. This
effort was also unsuccessful. Id. at 375-76.
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tice.81 Physicians, hospital boards, nurses, Health Ministry administra-
tors, and some judicial and political officials have openly accepted it.82
The acceptance of euthanasia may appear to be a positive step to-
ward recognizing the rights of individuals to choose their own fate.83
The High Court of The Hague, in accordance with the Supreme
Court's instructions, recognized an individual's right of self-determina-
tion when it held that a physician can perform euthanasia when a pa-
tient is in "dire distress" and expresses a wish to die.84 Several scholars
of Dutch euthanasia believe that the acceptance of euthanasia in the
Netherlands, however, has led to abuses that have resulted in an ironic
reversal of individual autonomy for some.85 Involuntary euthanasia is
not an uncommon occurrence,8 6 despite the guideline requirements that
the patient must request it.87 In many instances, the patient has not
clearly expressed a wish to die.88 Not infrequently, family members re-
quest euthanasia for the patient without the patient's consent.8 9
Some experts on Dutch euthanasia assert that voluntary euthanasia
is inextricably connected to involuntary euthanasia. 90 Two Dutch schol-
ars have reported that a startling ninety percent of euthanasia cases are
In 1987, the KNMG and the Nurses' Union issued a joint proposal unequivocally
advocating active euthanasia and detailing an allocation of duties between nurses and
physicians. Id. at 378. Furthermore, in 1987 the Royal Netherlands Society for the
Promotion of Pharmacy, an organization that includes most of the pharmacists in the
Netherlands, distributed a pamphlet containing all the drugs and mixtures that could
be used to perform euthanasia. Id. The Society designed the pamphlet for use by mem-
bers of the KNMG. Id.
81. Id. at 378.
82. Id.
83. See Gevers, supra note 60, at 156-57 (stating that if the decision to perform
euthanasia is made by a knowledgeable, coherent patient, no legal difficulties arise).
84. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the right of self-de-
termination recognized by the High Court of the Hague in its ruling expanding the
group of individuals that can undergo euthanasia).
85. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 477 (stating that the widespread practice of
euthanasia has caused some to worry that it has become involuntary).
86. See van der Sluis, supra note 12, at 460-61 (elaborating on several accounts of
involuntary euthanasia).
87. See supra notes 37-42, 51-57 and accompanying text (detailing euthanasia
guidelines).
88. See van der Sluis, supra note 12, at 461 (detailing an account of euthanasia
coaxed by the wife of a cancer patient).
89. Id. at 462. Family members may address the subject of euthanasia with the
physician without the patient's knowledge. Id. (citing C. Spreeuwenberg, Huisarts en
Stervenshulp (1981) (unpublished doctrinal thesis at Utrecht)).
90. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 24 (discussing the phenomenon of involuntary
euthanasia); see also Schepens, supra note 10, at 378-79 (indicating the danger of
involuntary euthanasia). Some doctors have become autonomous judges deciding who
should live and who should die. Id. at 379. Such physicians are usually found innocent
if brought to trial because they have followed the correct guidelines for the practice of
euthanasia. Id.
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involuntary."' Yet another scholar has labeled Dutch euthanasia
"uncontrollable.19 2
One survey of older persons interviewed in nursing homes indicated
that between fifty and sixty percent feared involuntary euthanasia, and
ninety-five percent opposed its legalization."' One study of Dutch eu-
thanasia indicated that voluntary euthanasia is accompanied by
crypthanasia, described as active euthanasia on sick people without
their consent. " The acceptance of euthanasia has resulted in the invol-
untary deaths of broader categories of patients who do not meet the
guideline requirements.95 Such occurrences are well known in medical
91. See Dessaur & Rutenfrans, supra note 31, at 402 (discussing euthanasia statis-
tics in the Netherlands). According to these scholars, the arguments put forth by pro-
ponents of the movement to legalize euthanasia are invalid. Id. at 405. For example,
proponents have typically argued that euthanasia should be made statutorily legal to
reflect its daily practice. Id. The scholars point out, however, that such an argument
must fail because it would be senseless to argue, by analogy, that murder should be
legal because of the frequency of its occurrence. Id. More importantly, the scholars
argue that widespread use of involuntary euthanasia should not be used to substantiate
a legitimate need for the legalization of voluntary euthanasia. Id. Furthermore, the
guidelines already established by the legal system will protect physicians involved in
euthanasia that is actually voluntary.
92. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 477 (quoting the author's view).
93. Id. In response to this fear and opposition, The Netherlands Patient Organiza-
tion was formed, which serves to alert ill persons and their families that involuntary
euthanasia is performed in some hospitals. Id. at 478.
94. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 25 (describing crypthanasia). According to two
polls, 77% of the Dutch public approves of involuntary euthanasia. Id. A book by
H.W.A. Hilhorst, titled EUTHANASIA IN THE HOSPITAL (in Dutch), includes the results
of euthanasia studies conducted in eight hospitals. Id. The author discusses cases of
involuntary, active euthanasia on adults and children, and concludes that crypthanasia
is not a phenomenon that occurs only sporadically. Id.
At a senior citizens' home at the Hague, for example, a doctor killed 21 men and
women without their consent. van der Sluis, supra note 12, at 463. The doctor believed
he acted in a beneficial way, helping the elderly die peacefully and painlessly. Id.
The doctor pleaded guilty to only five of the 21 killings, was accused of only four,
and convicted of only three. Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 25. The vice-president of the
KNMG and the former attorney general at the Supreme Court supported the doctor.
Id. Similarly, four nurses who admitted killing several unconscious patients in a hospi-
tal received support from the hospital and other groups. Id. The Amsterdam court
released the nurses from custody, concluding that their conduct was the result of hu-
mane considerations to alleviate the patients' suffering. Id.
Thus, it is apparent that several of the Netherlands' highest authorities feel little
disdain for euthanasia and may even look upon it favorably. Id. The advisor to the
Dutch government on judicial aspects of euthanasia stated that the government decided
to keep cases of crypthanasia out of the prohibitive reach of the criminal code. Id.
Further, the Dutch Society for Voluntary Euthanasia advocates active euthanasia on
demented elderly, unconscious victims of road accidents, and some handicapped chil-
dren. Id. at 25. A scholar of Dutch euthanasia noted the "widely shared convictions
that people's lives may be cut short whenever there are good reasons for doing so." Id.
at 26.
95. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 473 (arguing that euthanasia, as practiced in
the Netherlands, far exceeds the KNMG guidelines). But see Henk Rigter, Euthanasia
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circles.96 There exists a widespread practice of intentionally denying
certain groups of people needed medical care.97 Handicapped babies,
the elderly, and single people without close family are among those
whose lives have been taken against their will.9 Euthanasia advocates
rationalize these deaths on grounds that the individual's best interest is
served.99 They further argue that society should not be burdened with
keeping such groups of people alive.'00
In summary, although euthanasia is technically illegal in the Nether-
lands, physicians will not be prosecuted if they act within judicially
created guidelines. 101 In practice, however, fewer prosecutions occur
under the guidelines than should.' 02 Although some authorities deny
that euthanasia has been abused to the point that involuntary euthana-
in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Facts from Fiction, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32
(Jan./Feb. 1989) (repudiating the view that active euthanasia is widespread and
uncontrollable).
96. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 480 (asserting that the prevailing attitude is
reflected in the pressure placed on patients to voluntarily request euthanasia). Physi-
cians who are strong advocates of euthanasia often convince their patients that their
futures will be long and painful, and that death would be a less painful solution. Id.
The patient inevitably becomes distraught and may, under these circumstances, "volun-
tarily" choose to die. Id.
97. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 24 (discussing the intentional denial of medical
treatment to certain groups of people).
98. See id. at 24 (citing examples where certain groups of people were intentionally
denied medical treatment). With regard to euthanasia performed on handicapped ba-
bies, an analogous debate in the United States concerns women having abortions after
discovering that their child will be handicapped. See Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126,
1128-29 (Okla. 1987) (holding a physician not liable on a negligence theory for failing
to disclose material information concerning abortion as a course of treatment after dis-
covering that the woman's fetus suffered a severe brain development abnormality). See
also Learning Terrible Truths; Heart Wrenching Choices After Testing Fetuses For
Gene Defects, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1990, at 7 (discussing a woman's choice to have an
abortion after being informed by her doctor that her baby suffered from a serious chro-
mosome abnormality).
99. See Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 24 (discussing typical justifications offered by
doctors in favor of euthanasia).
100. Id.
101. See Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 439 (discussing the requirements for legally
performing euthanasia). See also supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing
euthanasia guidelines).
102. See supra note 32 (explaining why few prosecutions occur).
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sia has become a problem, 10 3 the perceptions and assessments of those
who believe the contrary'" should not be cursorily discounted.
II. EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES: A CLASH
BETWEEN JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND POPULAR
PREFERENCE
A. PASSIVE EUTHANASIA, OR THE RIGHT TO HAVE LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT REMOVED
1. Sources of the Right to Refuse Treatment
The right to refuse medical treatment stems from two sources: the
common law right of bodily self-determination, 0 5 and the constitu-
tional right to privacy.106 The right of bodily self-determination reflects
the concept that individuals have an interest in being free from inva-
sions of their bodily integrity.10 7 At common law, nonconsensual touch-
ing constituted a battery.108 The doctrine of informed consent devel-
oped to protect an individual's interest in bodily integrity. 09 Informed
consent stipulates that a patient must be able to reason and make vol-
103. See Rigter, supra note 95, at 31 (repudiating the existence of widespread
abuses of euthanasia). In response to those who may believe that economic motives in
reducing health care costs are intertwined with the practice of euthanasia, at least one
authority has disputed this belief. Id. at 32. Because the Netherlands has a well-funded
health care system, physicians do not have an economic motive to reduce costs by advo-
cating euthanasia. Id.
104. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text (describing the view that eu-
thanasia in the Netherlands has been abused).
105. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing the right of self-
determination); see also supra notes 27, 62, 72 and accompanying text (asserting that
the right to terminate one's life is based on the right of self-determination in the
Netherlands).
106. See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (explicating sources of the right to refuse treatment). In addition, the right to
refuse medical treatment is sometimes based on the constitutional right to religious
freedom. See Hirsch, supra note 7, at 827 (discussing the right of self-determination,
the constitutional right to privacy, and the constitutional right of religious freedom as
sources of the right to refuse treatment).
107. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424 (Mass. 1977) (noting that "the law recognizes the individual interest in preserving
'the inviolability of his person' ") (citation omitted). As early as 1914, Judge Cardozo
stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body ..... Schloendorff v. Soey of N.Y.
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
108. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9,
at 39 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the tort of battery).
109. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) (discussing the doctrine
of informed consent).
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untary judgments, and that the patient must clearly understand the na-
ture of the illness, including the risks and benefits of alternative treat-
ments. 110 Several state courts have based the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on the common law right of informed consent."'
The second source of the right to refuse medical treatment lies in the
constitutional right to privacy." 2 Although the Constitution does not
explicitly enumerate a privacy interest, the courts have recognized such
a privacy right in certain circumstances. 1 3 The California Court of
Appeals in Bouvia v. Superior Court,"4 for example, held that the
Constitution guarantees the privacy right of a competent adult to re-
fuse medical treatment, even when the treatment could save or prolong
life." 5 Several courts have recognized the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment based on the constitutional right to privacy." 6 An individ-
ual's right to refuse medical treatment, however, is not absolute," 17 and
must be balanced against the interests of the state." 8
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (Ill. 1989) (holding
that the common law right to refuse medical treatment includes the termination of
artificial nutrition); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987) (holding that an
individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is rooted in the common law doc-
trine of informed consent); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y.) (relying on
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), in asserting the
common law right to decline medical treatment, except in cases where the patient is
unconscious and where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
112. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222 (discussing the constitutional right of privacy
in relation to the right to make decisions concerning one's body). The right to privacy
was first articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), which held
that married couples may use contraceptives. The Supreme Court extended this right
to a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973).
113. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (extending the consti-
tutional right to privacy to nonmarried persons' freedom to use contraception).
114. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id. at 301. Prior to recognizing a constitutional privacy interest, the Supreme
Court recognized a liberty interest in refusing undesired medical treatment. See Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-28 (1905) (weighing an individual's liberty in-
terest in refusing smallpox vaccination against the state's interest in preventing
disease).
116. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that a patient's right to refuse treatment originates in the constitutional
right to privacy); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that the right to refuse treatment is based on a constitutional right to pri-
vacy); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 660, 664 (N.J.) (holding that a patient's guardian
may, on the patient's behalf, exercise the patient's constitutionally-based right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
117. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
118. See id. (discussing countervailing state interests in the preservation of life).
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2. Countervailing State Interests
Courts have typically identified four state interests that must be bal-
anced against an individual's right to refuse medical treatment: the
preservation of life," 9 the prevention of suicide, 120 the safeguarding of
the medical profession's integrity, 2 ' and the protection of innocent
third parties. 2 2 The most significant state interest is preserving life,1 23
which is composed of two aspects, the state interest in preserving the
sanctity of life in general, and the state interest in preserving a particu-
lar individual's life.124 The state's interest in prolonging life must be
balanced against an individual's freedom to reject intrusions on bodily
integrity and the right to privacy. 28 As the Supreme Court of New
Jersey indicated in In re Quinlan,26 the state's interest in preserving
life is overcome by the individual's right to privacy as the chances for
recovery decline and as the level of bodily invasion increases. 21
The state's interest in preserving life gives rise to its interest in pro-
tecting people from self-destruction, i.e., suicide.' 28 The decision to de-
cline life-sustaining treatment, however, is not necessarily an attempt





123. See id. (citing The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sus-
taining Treatment 23, 32 (1983) [hereinafter President's Commission Report]). Con-
gress established the President's Commission in 1978 for the purpose of proposing
guidelines for resolving issues relevant to the right to dic debate. Id. at 1220. The
Commission stated the issue precisely: "Once someone realizes that the time and man-
ner of death are substantially under the control of medical science, he or she wants to
be protected against decisions that make death too easy and quick as well as from those
that make it too agonizing and prolonged." Id. (quoting President's Commission Re-
port at 23).
124. Id. at 1223. The state interest in preserving life will not normally outweigh an
individual's right to determine life-sustaining treatment when the individual is compe-
tent to make the decision. Id. Because the life that the state seeks to protect is the life
who is making the decision, the state is not attempting to protect a life that cannot
protect itself. Id. Assuming that the "'sanctity of individual free choice and self-deter-
mination [are] fundamental constituents of life,' the value of life may be lessened
rather than increased 'by the failure to allow a competent human being the right of
choice.'" Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977)).
125. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
126. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nora., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
127. Id. at 664.
128. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
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to commit suicide.'2 9 Exercising the right to decline treatment reflects
an individual's wish to end life in a personally preferred manner. 30 A
wish to decline treatment is not necessarily a wish to die, but a wish to
be free of unwanted medical treatment.' 3'
The third state interest, maintaining the integrity of the medical pro-
fession, seeks to ensure that proper medical care is given to those in
need.' 3 2 The physician-patient relationship is analogous to a fiduciary
relationship whereby the physician has a broad duty to care for the
patient.13 3 Encompassed within this duty is the physician's obligation to
administer life-sustaining nutrition and hydration when necessary.134
When a physician-patient relationship exists and the patient is depen-
dent on the physician, the state may not deprive a person of the physi-
cian's care arbitrarily. 35 Medical ethics, however, do not mandate
medical intervention to sustain life at all costs. 136 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted in In re Conroy,137 there are certain instances
when a physician's most appropriate role may be to ease the process of
dying, rather than to prolong a painful death. 38
The state may also have an interest in protecting third parties from
the adverse effects of an individual's decision to forego medical treat-
ment.139 When the health and safety of innocent third parties may be
jeopardized, courts will generally give less weight to the individual's
right of self-determination. 40 For example, the state may require indi-
viduals to undergo medical procedures to protect the public health.14 '
The right of self-determination normally outweighs the foregoing
state interests when the situation involves an individual who is compe-
129. See id. (articulating the nuances of the wish to decline life-sustaining
treatment).
130. Id.
131. Id. Specifically, the court stated: "People who refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment may not harbor a specific intent to die; rather, they may fervently wish to
live, but to do so free of unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs, and without
protracted suffering." Id. (citations omitted).
132. Bopp, supra note 4, at 5.
133. Id.
134. See id. (describing the physician-patient relationship). Bopp argues that per-
mitting physicians to withhold nutrition from the patient would undermine the trust
that is the traditional keystone in the patient-physician relationship. Id.
135. See id. at 16 (defending a patient's right to receive medical treatment).
136. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
137. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
138. Id. at 1224-25.
139. Id. at 1225.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a Massa-
chusetts law imposing punishment for failure to be vaccinated against the smallpox
epidemic).
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tent to make health care decisions."' When an incompetent individual
is involved, however, the situation is less easily resolved because the
individual is unable to exercise the right to accept or refuse medical
treatment. 14
3
3. The Right of Incompetent Individuals to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatment
a. The Supreme Court Decision
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 4' Nancy Cruzan
sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident, and later lapsed
into a persistent vegetative state.'" The United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether a state may require clear and convincing
evidence that such an incompetent individual would have wanted life-
sustaining treatment withdrawn.14 6 The Court held that a state may
require such a standard of proof prior to terminating medical treat-
ment.147 Therefore, when a state so requires, a patient's family must
present clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes before
making a decision on the patient's behalf."4 8
In reaching its decision, the Court first assessed whether an individ-
ual possesses a constitutional right to refuse treatment. 14  Noting that
lower courts typically rely on either the doctrine of informed consent or
on the constitutional right to privacy, the Court found that a competent
person possesses a liberty interest in refusing treatment under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 0  When the individual is
142. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225.
143. Id. at 1227. Surrogate decisionmakers, acting on behalf of the incompetent
patient, must attempt to exercise the full scope of an indiiduals right of self-determi-
nation, which includes both the right to employ or refuse life-sustaining treatment. Id.
144. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
145. Id. at 2844-45. A patient in a persistent vegetative state exhibits motor re-
flexes, but possesses no cognitive abilities. Id. at 2842.
146. Id. at 2851-52.
147. Id. at 2856.
148. Id. Justice Rehnquist asserted that since there is no guarantee that the views
of close family members would be the same as the patient's, the Constitution does not
require the state to accept the decision of a surrogate. Id.
149. Id. at 2846.
150. Id. at 2851. Relying on Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the
Court in Cruzan stated that, "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right to
refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we
have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interest." Id. at 2851 n.7. But see id. at 2860-63 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (asserting that constitutional rights are not implicated because termination
of life-sustaining medical treatment constitutes assisted suicide, which the states are
authorized to prevent). This issue was also raised by the dissenting judge in Brophy v.
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incompetent, however, the "hypothetical"'' right must be exercised on
the patient's behalf. 152 The Court weighed the patient's liberty interest
against Missouri's countervailing interests in holding that the state
could impose a "clear and convincing" standard of proof before a sur-
rogate could carry out the patient's wishes.' 53
The state of Missouri relied primarily on its interest in preserving
life to justify its imposition of the clear and convincing standard of
proof.1 54 The Court reasoned that the state was entitled to safeguard
against abuses of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in cases
concerning surrogate decisionmakers. 55 For example, the possibility
exists that some families would decide to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment out of selfish motives.'56 The Court concluded that Missouri
could impose a clear and convincing standard of evidence to avoid this
problem.' 57
New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986), where the court held that
the wife of a nonterminally-ill, incompetent man in a persistent vegetative state could
decide to order the withdrawal of feeding tubes on his behalf. Id. at 638-40. The dis-
senting judge argued that the majority opinion essentially allowed a suicide to occur.
Id. at 642-43 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
151. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990). Al-
though the majority believed that an incompetent individual possesses the right to re-
fuse treatment, the court labeled it "hypothetical" because the individual is incapable
of exercising the right. Id.
152. Id. at 2852. The Court also held, however, that the Constitution does not re-
quire the state of Missouri to accept the substituted judgment of close family members
when proof of the patient's own wishes is lacking. Id. at 2855.
153. Id. at 2852-54. The Court, quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982), stated that "[w]hether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated
must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state inter-
ests." Id. at 2851-52.
154. Id. at 2852-53. The Court emphasized the extremely personal nature of the
decision to withdraw life support medical treatment. Id. It stated that in order to pro-
tect the personal nature of the right, the heightened evidentiary standard adopted by
the state of Missouri was appropriate. Id. If such a standard were not imposed, the
state's ability to protect its interest in preserving life would not be carried through
effectively. Id. As support for this reasoning, the Court used as an example a situation
in which the family would not seek to protect the patient's best interests, but its own
interests. Id. at 2853 (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 477 (N.J. 1987)). In In re
Jobes, the New Jersey Supreme Court cautioned that "whenever a health-care profes-
sional becomes uncertain about whether family members are properly protecting a pa-
tient's interests, termination of life sustaining treatment should not occur without the
appointment of a guardian." Jobes, 529 A.2d at 447.
155. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. The Court also stated: "[W]e think a State may
properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individ-
ual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual." Id.
156. Id. See supra note 154 (noting the possibility that family members may not
act in the patient's best interests).
157. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854. The evidence presented in support of the argu-
ment that Nancy Cruzan would have wanted to terminate life support consisted pri-
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, noted that
individual states may develop procedures to safeguard the liberty inter-
ests of those who become incompetent." 8 She pointed out that many
states do in fact recognize the need for procedural safeguards and often
implement the use of "living wills." 1 " A living will establishes an indi-
vidual's preference for withholding life-support medical treatment in
the event that one becomes unable to express one's wishes.'60 Several
states have enacted durable power of attorney statutes authorizing an
individual to appoint a surrogate to make medical decisions in the event
that one becomes unable to do so.'
Although the ability of the states to recognize the authority of surro-
gate decisionmakers constitutes a safeguard of an incompetent individ-
ual's right to refuse treatment, the decision in Cruzan nevertheless per-
mits a state to exert influence on a personal, private matter.'6 2 The
counterargument to the majority's ruling is that the decision to forego
marily of statements she made to a housemate approximately one year before the acci-
dent that left her in a coma. Id. at 2855. She remarked at the time that she would not
want to live as a "vegetable." Id. The Court affirmed the interpretation of the Supreme
Court of Missouri that such evidence fails to meet the "clear and convincing" standard.
Id.
On December 14, 1990, Judge Teel of the Circuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri
ruled that new evidence submitted by Nancy Cruzan's family was sufficient to satisfy
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof. See Summary of December 14, 1990
ruling, reprinted in 6 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 433 (1991) (reviewing the circuit court's
decision subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan). Nancy died twelve
days following the termination of the artificial feeding. Id. at 434.
The impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan has been apparent, at least in
the state of Missouri. Christine Busalacchi is a young woman who has been in a persis-
tent vegetative state since the day she suffered head trauma in an automobile accident
in 1987. See In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991) (LEXIS,
States library, MO file). Her father, who was also her court-appointed guardian,
wished to transfer her to a facility in Minnesota. Id. The state of Missouri alleged that
the guardian intended to avoid the clear and convincing standard upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Cruzan. Id. The Court decided that because the specific issue was
whether the guardian could move his daughter to another state, the case should be
remanded to determine whether the patient's needs are being met in Missouri. Id. The
burden of proof would then shift to the guardian to prove that better care could be
provided in Minnesota. Id.
158. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
159. See id. at 2858 n.4 (listing states that have adopted living will statutes,
thereby permitting an individual to appoint a health care proxy).
160. See Zisser, supra note 24, at 374 (discussing living wills).
161. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857-58 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (listing states
that have adopted durable power of attorney statutes authorizing the appointment of
proxies to make health care decisions).
162. Id. at 2852 (holding that the state is not required to remain neutral and may
affirmatively assert its interest in preserving life); see Susan R. Martyn & Henry J.
Bourguignon, Coming to Terms With Death: the Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 817,
851-52 (1991) (asserting that the state should be prevented from imposing a substan-
tive standard in a decision concerning life and death).
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life-sustaining treatment is an intimate one that properly rests within
the scope of private family life.1 63 Scholars supporting this argument
assert that family members should be able to exercise an incompetent
individual's right to refuse medical treatment.""
Justice William Brennan, dissenting in Cruzan, argued that all per-
sons have a fundamental right to be free of unwanted medical care,
stating that this right is not lost simply because one becomes incompe-
tent.6 5 He relied on earlier Court decisions that recognized fundamen-
tal rights within a family setting. 6 ' Moreover, he argued that Mis-
souri's requirement of clear and convincing evidence placed an
unconstitutional restraint on Nancy Cruzan's right to be free of un-
wanted medical care.16 7
Although the right to be free of unwanted medical care is not abso-
lute, Justice Brennan contended that state interests should never out-
weigh it.' 68 The state possesses an interest in preventing abuse by sur-
163. Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 162, at 852.
164. See id. at 851-54 (arguing that an individual's family members should make
the decision whether to terminate life-sustaining treatment).
165. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued
that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is a fundamental one. Id. at 2864.
If the right is considered to be fundamental, any countervailing state policy must be
very closely tailored to fit the interest that the state seeks to fulfill. Id.
Justice Brennan reiterated that the majority opinion openly acknowledged that a
competent person has a liberty interest, rooted in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, to be free of unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 2865. Therefore,
Justice Brennan continued, if the right is to be properly considered a liberty interest, it
must be fundamental. Id. Justice Brennan also observed that the right to refuse un-
wanted medical care is clearly among those principles "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. (quoting Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
As previously noted, the fact that Nancy Cruzan was incompetent to make a deci-
sion did not destroy her fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 2867.
Justice Brennan argued that the state is not in a better position than a patient's family
to decide what choice the patient would have made. Id. at 2877. He contended that
"[iun these unfortunate situations, the bodies and preferences and memories of the vic-
tims do not escheat to the State; nor does our Constitution permit the State or any
other government to commandeer them." Id. at 2878. The State is a stranger to the
patient, Justice Brennan continued, whereas "[flamily members are best qualified to
make substituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar
grasp of the patient's approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with him
or her. . . . It is. . .they who treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a
cause." Id. at 2877 (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (N.J. 1987)).
166. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cites as
examples of fundamental rights granted by the Constitution the holdings in Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (upholding the fundamental right to marry), and Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (upholding the fundamental right to select
family living arrangements).
167. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2869.
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rogate decisionmakers who may not properly consider the patient's
interest, but may make a decision based on their own emotional
strain.169 Therefore, the state has a parens patriae interest in providing
the incompetent patient with procedural safeguards to permit an accu-
rate determination of what the patient would have wanted. 70 As Jus-
tice Brennan indicated, however, the imposition of a clear and convinc-
ing standard extends beyond the state's power in accomplishing this
goal because the standard constitutes an asymmetrical evidentiary bur-
den. 17' No proof is required to support a finding that the patient would
wish to continue treatment, but clear and convincing evidence is re-
quired to terminate treatment.17 2
Further, two commentators recently asserted that requiring a high
evidentiary standard to prevent abuse by a surrogate decisionmaker
disregards the state's inability to make personalized decisions.'17 Al-
though allowing family members to decide on behalf of a patient is not
error-free, mistakes in judgment that may occur will be individual ones
and not made by the state, which knows nothing about the particular
patient's needs or desires." 4 Moreover, the state would be acting out of
what it perceives to be society's best interests, which are not necessarily
the patient's best interests. 5
Although the particular issue in Cruzan pertains to passive euthana-
sia, while the controversy in the Netherlands focuses on active euthana-
sia, both involve the right to make the inherently private decision be-
169. Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 162, at 843-44 n.127 (citing A. Metsel,
THE RIGHT TO DIE § 6.25, at 167 (1989)).
170. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2871-72.
172. Id.
173. Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 162, at 845. Assigning decisionmaking to
the state increases the risk of error in determining what the patient would have wanted
because the state would be incapable of determining the patient's wishes. Id. at 846.
See also supra note 165 (articulating Justice Brennan's argument that family members
are better able than the state to ascertain a patient's wishes).
174. Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 162, at 846.
175. Id. Justice Brennan also looked beyond the facts of the case, and offered a
possible implication of the Court's holding. He reasoned that if the state were to prevail
over family members acting on behalf of an individual, this would imply that the state
could choose to perform other medical procedures on the patient as long as the patient
didn't experience pain. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2869 n.13. Justice Brennan suggested
that a kidney could be removed to benefit a third party in need, or other procedures
could be performed to benefit others without the consent of the patient or a surrogate.
Id. See also Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 162, at 845 (arguing that if the state's
interests are given priority and the state can mandate life-sustaining treatment, then it
also possesses the power to stop such treatment if state interests would be served,
thereby destroying groups of people who are sick or dying).
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tween life and death. 176 The ultimate consequence of both issues is the
impact on an individual's right of self-determination.'" When a state
imposes a high evidentiary standard to determine what an incompetent
individual's wishes would be, the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan
may signify the potential curtailment of an individual's right of self-
determination. 7  This contrasts with the policy in the Netherlands,
which recognizes an individual's right of self-determination by allowing
an individual to make the personal life and death decision within the
boundaries of judicial guidelines. 7 1
b. State Court Decisions
Cases decided by some state courts prior to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cruzan recognized the authority of a surrogate to exercise a
patient's right to terminate life-sustaining treatment. 80 The New
Jersey Supreme Court was the first court to address the issue of eutha-
nasia in In re Quinlan.'' This case involved a woman in a permanent
vegetative state, kept alive by a respirator and a feeding tube. 82 The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that her father, as her guardian, could
exercise her constitutional right to privacy,18 3 and allowed him to make
176. See supra notes 33-75, 144-75 and accompanying text (discussing euthanasia
in the Netherlands and in the United States).
177. See supra notes 62, 72, 108-11 and accompanying text (describing the right of
self-determination recognized by Dutch courts and by state court cases).
178. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's
dissent in Cruzan).
179. See supra notes 33-75 and accompanying text (evaluating court cases in the
Netherlands).
180. See infra notes 181-92 and accompanying text (discussing selected state court
cases).
181. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
182. Id. at 654-56. Karen Quinlan had stopped breathing without medical explana-
tion, and later slipped into a comatose state. Id. at 653-54. Her doctors diagnosed her
as being in a persistent vegetative state, having no cognitive functions, but retaining
primitive reflex abilities. Id. at 654. The medical experts reached the consensus that
she could never be restored to cognitive life. Id. at 655.
183. Id. at 664. The New Jersey Supreme Court initially noted that the United
States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the right to privacy was said to derive from the
penumbra of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. The
court asserted that the privacy right is broad enough to include an individual's decision
to refuse medical treatment under certain circumstances, just as the privacy right has
been interpreted to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under cer-
tain conditions. Id. at 663.
The court observed that the state's interest in preserving life could not outweigh
Karen Quinlan's right to privacy. Id. at 664. Moreover, "[t]he only practical way to
prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render
their best judgment, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she
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the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, if both her doctor
and the hospital ethics committee concluded that she had no chance of
recovery.' In so holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that the patient's right to privacy outweighed the state's interest in pre-
serving her life. 8 "
The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy, 88 affirmed the
Quinlan holding that an incompetent individual retains the right to re-
fuse treatment.' 87 In contrast to the basis for its decision in Quinlan,
however, the court relied on the common law right of self-determina-
tion rather than on the constitutional right to privacy.188 The court con-
ducted a detailed analysis that would allow life-sustaining treatment to
be withdrawn without requiring any evidence of the patient's wishes so
long as the burden of continued treatment outweighed its benefits. 18 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts similarly recognized
the authority of a surrogate decisionmaker in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.9 0 The court ruled that a pro-
bate court could exercise the right to refuse chemotherapy on behalf of
a profoundly retarded elderly man with leukemia, provided that the
probate court attempted to ascertain what the patient would have
wanted under such circumstances.'19 The court based its decision both
would exercise it in these circumstances." Id. The qualification alluded to was that the
hospital ethics committee concur in the opinion of Karen's physicians that she had no
chance of recovery from her comatose state. Id. at 672.
184. Id. at 671-72.
185. Id. at 663-64.
186. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
187. Id. at 1236.
188. Id. at 1223.
189. See id. at 1229-37 (describing when the withdrawal of life-support treatment
will be permitted). In reaching its decision, the court determined that an incompetent
individual's right to refuse treatment could be exercised by a surrogate decisionmaker
using one of three standards. The first standard is a subjective one, to be used when
clear evidence of the individual's wishes exists. Id. at 1229-30. Under the subjective
test, the surrogate decisionmaker attempts to determine whether the individual would
have wanted life-sustaining treatment removed. Id. Clear evidence of the patient's
wishes is required. Id. The second test is a limited objective test, which is used when
some evidence of the individual's wishes exist, but not enough to satisfy the subjective
test. Id. at 1232. Using this standard, treatment can be terminated when the surrogate
decisionmaker takes into account the existing evidence and also ascertains that the bur-
den of continuing life-sustaining treatment outweighs the benefits. Id. The third stan-
dard is purely objective, which the surrogate decisionmaker would apply when no evi-
dence exists as to what the individual would have wanted. Id. at 1232. Using this test,
if the burden of treatment outweighs the benefits of living, life-sustaining treatment
may be removed. Id.
190. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
191. Id. at 430-32. In Saikewicz, the patient was a 67 year old profoundly mentally
retarded man with a fatal form of leukemia. Id. at 419. The relevant issue was whether
he should be given chemotherapy treatment. Id. at 420-21. If he were left untreated,
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on the constitutional right to privacy and the common law doctrine of
informed consent.192
c. Significance of State Court Decisions and Justice Brennan's Dis-
sent in Cruzan
Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan and the holdings of state court
cases recognize the importance of allowing a surrogate decisionmaker
to exercise a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, 193 guaranteed
by the constitutional right to privacy and by the common law doctrine
of informed consent.194 Although a state's interest in preserving life is
an important one, as Justice Brennan articulated in his dissent, an indi-
vidual's rights should not be dismissed merely because one has not
clearly and convincingly expressed one's wishes with regard to main-
taining or removing life-sustaining treatment. 19 5
According to the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In
re Quinlan, the only way to safeguard an individual's right to refuse
treatment is to permit family members or a guardian to decide on be-
half of the patient.'96 The presumption that those who are incompetent
to make a decision should not have life-support treatment removed if
they fail to meet a clear and convincing evidentiary standard displays a
the disease would run its natural course and would not inflict any pain on the patient,
although he would die within weeks. Id. However, if he underwent chemotherapy, he
would suffer severe and painful side effects. Id. In addition, the patient would be una-
ble to comprehend the reasons for the medical treatment and he would be involuntarily
placed in a state of great suffering. Id. at 432. Under such circumstances, the court
ruled that no state interest prevailed over the patient's right to decline treatment. Id. at
435. Further, the probate court had properly considered what the patient's wishes
would have been if he had been cognizant of his situation. Id. at 431-32.
Compare Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430-32 (allowing a probate court to ascertain
the patient's wishes) with In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.) (holding that a surrogate
decisionmaker could not exercise the patient's right to refuse medical treatment when
the patient was a mentally retarded man who had never been fully mentally cognizant,
thereby making it impossible to ascertain what the patient's wishes would have been),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). In In re Eichner, decided simultaneously with In re
Storar, the court did not reach the issue of whether a surrogate could exercise the right
of a brain-damaged elderly man who was in a persistent vegetative state. In re Eichner,
420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981). The court found clear and convincing evidence that
he would not have wanted to be kept alive under such conditions. Id.
192. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
193. See supra notes 165-92 and accompanying text (discussing a surrogate's au-
thority to exercise an individual's right to refuse medical treatment).
194. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text (examining the sources of the
right to refuse medical treatment).
195. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text (disputing the Court's argu-
ment that a state may impose a clear and convincing evidentiary standard).
196. See supra note 183 (describing the New Jersey Supreme Court's view of how
an individual's rights are best protected).
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disrespect for their human worth. 1 7 Insofar as the position taken by
Justice Brennan in Cruzan and by some state courts preserves an indi-
vidual's right to make personal decisions,B s the policy is similar in ef-
fect to the stance adopted by the judicial system in the Netherlands,
which permits an individual to make the intimate decision between life
and death.1 99
d. The Legislature
As Justice O'Connor discussed in her concurring opinion in Cruzan,
state legislatures are free to enact living will statutes that allow individ-
uals to appoint proxies to make health care decisions on their behalf in
the event that they become unable to do so.200 The Supreme Court's
decision in Cruzan gave rise to a heightened concern regarding the leg-
islature's role in recognizing the authority of surrogate deci-
sionmakers. 01 In October 1990, Congress enacted the Patient Self-De-
termination Act202 [hereinafter "the Act"], requiring hospitals, nursing
homes, and hospices to advise patients of their right to implement an
advance directive,20 3 indicating their wishes regarding life-support
treatment. 20 4 The Act also requires that health care providers advise
patients of their right to accept or refuse medical care.20 5 The Act rec-
ognizes the priority given to a patient's own preferences, thus reinforc-
197. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(Mass. 1977). A presumption that incompetent individuals should have life-sustaining
treatment maintained in all situations when competent individuals may decide to de-
cline treatment in such situations places a lesser value on the human worth of those
who are incompetent. Id.
198. See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's
dissent and state court cases).
199. See supra notes 33-75 and accompanying text (evaluating court cases in the
Netherlands).
200. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (discussing living wills).
201. See generally Michael D. Cantor, Learning Fron: the Cruzan Decision: The
Need For Advance Directives, 265 JAMA 1751 (Apr. 3, 1991) (discussing the effects
of Cruzan).
202. Patient Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc).
203. Margot L. White & John C. Fletcher, The Patient Self-Determination Act:
On Balance, More Help Than Hindrance, 266 JAMA 410 (July 17, 1991). An advance
directive may take the form of a living will or the appointment of a health care proxy.
Id. at 410.
204. John LaPuma et al., Advance Directives on Admission: Clinical Implications
and Analysis of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402, 402
(July 17, 1991).
205. White & Fletcher, supra note 203, at 410.
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ing an individual's right of autonomy. 06 Therefore, while the Act per-
tains to the issue of passive euthanasia, it is a step toward recognizing
individual autonomy, which the Netherlands has already recognized by
permitting an individual to choose death by taking active measures.2 07
B. ACTIVE EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES
1. General Overview
Although most United States case law focuses on passive euthanasia,
active euthanasia is a separate issue that is also drawing attention. 08 A
concurring opinion in a decision by the California Court of Appeals
alluded to the practice of active euthanasia. 09 In the United States,
most state statutes classify assisted suicide as murder, manslaughter, or
the separate crime of "assisted suicide."21 For example, in 1986, a jury
found a man guilty of premeditated murder when he shot his wife to
206. LaPuma, supra note 204, at 403. The Act's provisions may also stimulate
family discussions and thereby improve the surrogate decisionmaker's accuracy in rep-
resenting the patient's wishes if the need arises. Id. at 403.
Despite the positive effects that the Act may have, possible drawbacks also exist. Id.
at 403-04. Barriers to implementation may exist because individuals will not always
complete the directives. Id. at 403. Further, physicians may feel uncomfortable discuss-
ing the options with patients, and instead, the physicians may wait for the patient to
initiate the discussion. Id. An important negative effect is the tension between the phy-
sicians' incentive to contain costs and the need to make an objective decision. Id. at
404. The Act is part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which aims to
decrease payments to Medicare-reimbursed providers. Id. The Act is expected to de-
crease provider costs on the assumption that elderly patients in particular will decide to
limit expensive treatment. Id. Therefore, the possibility exists that health care providers
will use the Act as a vehicle for meeting economic goals. Id. But cf Rigter, supra note
95, at 32 (asserting that economic goals do not provide an incentive for doctors to
advocate euthanasia in the Netherlands).
207. See supra notes 27, 62, 72 and accompanying text (discussing individual au-
tonomy recognized by courts in the Netherlands).
208. See Nerland, supra note 13 (analyzing voluntary, active euthanasia).
209. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal permitted a mentally-competent quadriplegic to have a feeding
tube removed, after having been confined to a bed and having experienced constant and
severe pain. Id. at 306. The court asserted that the right to refuse medical treatment
was a basic, fundamental right that should not be limited only to terminally-ill pa-
tients. Id. at 302.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Compton not only agreed with the majority opinion,
but also observed that in instances where pain and suffering is very severe, a patient's
choice to terminate life should be seen as a relieving process. Id. at 307 (Compton, J.,
concurring). He observed that the right to die is an important part of one's right to
control one's destiny, provided that in exercising one's right to die, the rights of others
are not harmed. Id. Further, he stated that the right to die encompasses one's right to
make death painless and easy, and to request assistance in dying from others, including
the medical profession. Id.
210. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
7.8, at 249-50 (1986).
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death to relieve her suffering from Alzheimer's disease and related ill-
nesses.211 His wife had experienced chronic pain, and had repeatedly
asked to die.212
Despite the classification of assisted suicide as a criminal act, courts
have inconsistently decided cases involving euthanasia.218 According to
one study, forty-eight mercy killings were reported between 1930 and
1960.214 In seventeen of these cases, the person who performed eutha-
nasia later committed suicide, and in eleven others, the person perform-
ing euthanasia was convicted of manslaughter or second degree mur-
der.215 Five of the forty-eight individuals who performed euthanasia
were convicted of first degree murder, while ten were found to be tem-
porarily insane.216 Only three cases led to acquittals, and just one case
was dismissed.2 17
The illegal status of active euthanasia in the United States contrasts
sharply with the approach taken in the Netherlands, which allows ac-
tive euthanasia within the bounds of judicial guidelines.218 While the
Netherlands has recognized an individual's right to decide to end one's
life using active measures, 219 the United States has not done so. 220 If
one adheres to the position taken by those who argue that no meaning-
ful distinction exists between active and passive euthanasia, since both
lead to the same result, 21 then it follows that if passive euthanasia is
allowed in recognition of an individual's right of self-determination,
then active euthanasia should similarly be permitted. Allowing active
euthanasia would acknowledge an individual's right of self-determina-
tion, which the Netherlands has recognized.222
211. Gilbert v. Florida, 487 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 494
So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1986). The court sentenced Mr. Gilbert to a term of life imprison-
ment with no possibility of release until his one-hundredth birthday. Id.
212. Id.
213. Hirsch, supra note 7, at 834.
214. Note, The Right of the Terminally Ill to Die, With Assistance If Necessary,




218. See supra notes 33-75 and accompanying text (discussing Dutch cases al-
lowing active euthanasia).
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (indicating that most states
consider active euthanasia illegal).
221. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the view that no
distinction should be made between active and passive euthanasia).
222. See supra notes 27, 62, 72 and accompanying text (describing the right of
self-determination recognized by Dutch courts).
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2. Recent Developments
Although most state statutes condemn active euthanasia, recent de-
velopments suggest that many individuals are dissatisfied with this pol-
icy and wish to expand the right of self-determination to include active
euthanasia. For example, on July 27, 1991, a grand jury in Rochester,
New York declined to indict Dr. Timothy Quill, who had prescribed a
barbiturate for a patient who expressed wishes to die after suffering
painfully from an incurable blood cancer. 223 Dr. Quill wrote about his
role in aiding the patient's death in the New England Journal of
Medicine, hoping to test the bounds of the legal system and recognizing
the need for the public and the legislature to acknowledge the existence
of active euthanasia.224 Many colleagues praised Dr. Quill for making
public a largely hidden practice.225
In contrast to Dr. Quill's case is that of Dr. Jack Kervorkian, who in
1990 developed a "suicide machine" for patients who wished to relieve
their intense suffering.226 Although the court dismissed a charge of first
degree murder against him in the death of a woman who used his ma-
chine, he was prohibited from using the suicide machine again. 2 7 More
recently, police arrested Dr. Kervorkian for the deaths of two seriously
ill women who also used his suicide machine to end their lives. 228
223. Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who said He Aided in
a Suicide, N.Y. TiMES, July 27, 1991, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Altman]; Her Physi-
cian Helped - A Message of Bravery in N.Y. Suicide Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 12,
1991, at A8.
224. Altman, supra note 223, at Al, col. 2. Dr. Quill stated that he intended to
provoke public discussion concerning the treatment of terminally-ill patients. Id. How-
ever, Dr Cranford, a physician who opposes active euthanasia, expressed worry that
some physicians might abuse the legalization of euthanasia. Id. More importantly, Dr.
Cranford accurately assessed the importance of Dr. Quill's acquittal: "[lI]t reflects a
loss of confidence in medicine by the American public and a feeling that they will lose
all control over their lives and that their lives will be unduly prolonged." Id.
Dr. Quill remarked that his case was "the tip of the iceberg," and that he has heard
many stories of other doctors who have acted similarly with their long-suffering pa-
tients. Id. Speaking about the grand jury's failure to indict Dr. Quill, a spokesperson
for the Hemlock Society, a right-to-die organization, stated: "Juries are seeing this
conduct as a compassion, a help." Id.
225. Altman, supra note 223, at AI, col. 2.
226. Jury Pool to be Quizzed in Assisted Suicide Trial, Gannett News Service,
May 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
227. Id.
228. William Douglas, Murder Charge for MD, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk
Edition), Feb. 6, 1992, at 3. Other recent developments indicate that the public is
becoming increasingly interested in debating the issue of active euthanasia. In another
incident, a court acquitted an individual who had helped his terminally-ill wife end her
life. Jury Deliberates in Trial of Suicide Helper, UPI, May 9, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991,
at Al, col. 4. The couple had traveled from California to Michigan, believing that
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Euthanasia advocates interpret the heightened awareness of active
euthanasia as an indication of the public's unhappiness with the health
care system's treatment of terminally ill individuals, and growing sym-
pathy for those who suffer chronic pain as a result of grave illness.
229
Opponents of euthanasia, however, argue that legalized active euthana-
sia will lead to abuses,230 such as the Netherlands has experienced.231
They argue that voluntary euthanasia will give rise to involuntary eu-
thanasia, and lead to a disrespect for the sanctity of human life.232
Some opponents also argue that the legalization of euthanasia will
trump the development of modern medicine.2 3 They reason that legal-
ized euthanasia provides fewer incentives for the medical profession to
assisted suicide was legal in that jurisdiction. Innocent Verdict Returned; Assisted Sui-
cide Case, UPI, May 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [herein-
after Innocent Verdict]. Derek Humphrey, the national director of the Hemlock Soci-
ety stated that "[tihe verdict sends a strong signal to legislators that the laws relating
to assistance in suicide need urgent and serious reform." Id. He also observed, "[t]he
public thinks this is an idea whose time has come. Hundreds of people every year ille-
gally help loved ones to die and lawmakers should now take time to carefully modify
the laws." Id.
The Hemlock Society, founded in 1980, advocates new laws permitting physicians to
assist the suicide of dying persons pursuant to strict criteria. Id. Washington state, in
its November 1991 election, defeated Initiative 119, a law that would have legalized
physician-assisted suicide. Philip J. Boyle, Vote Shows that Euthanasia Debate Will
Go On, Los ANGELES TimES, Nov. 9, 1991, at 17, col. 1. The law, however, was de-
feated by a narrow margin, suggesting that the issue is not a settled matter. Id. In
California, euthanasia advocates are attempting to place a "Death With Dignity" stat-
ute on their state ballot in November 1992. Lynn Smith, Right-to-Die Movement Gain-
ing, 'Final Exit' Author Says; Suicide: Doctors' Opposition to Assisting in Deaths of
the Terminally Ill is Diminishing, Leisure World Supporters Are Told, Los ANGELES
TmIES (Orange County Edition), Jan. 13, 1992, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter Smith, Right-
to-Die].
Perhaps one of the clearest indications of public sentiment on the issue arises from
the very high sales of a book entitled FINAL ExIT, written by Derek Humphrey, the
executive national director of the Hemlock Society. Good Morning America (ABC tel-
evision broadcast, Aug. 12, 1991). The book describes different ways in which one can
commit suicide. Id. One medical ethicist who commented on its high sales volume sug-
gested that the sales reflect several sources of discontent among the public: the public's
dissatisfaction with the health care system, discontent by society's elderly with respect
to how they are treated, and the inappropriateness of using high technology medical
treatment. Id. The book has sold several hundred thousand copies and is being re-
printed in several languages. Smith, Right-to-Die, at 1, col. 2.
229. See Innocent Verdict, May 11, 1991, supra note 228 (giving the opinion of
euthanasia advocates).
230. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text (describing abuses of
euthanasia).
231. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text (discussing euthanasia in the
Netherlands).
232. See Fenigsen, supra note 31 and accompanying text (arguing that voluntary
and involuntary euthanasia are intertwined).
233. Fenigsen, supra note 31, at 29.
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find cures for diseases.23 4 These concerns about legalized active eutha-
nasia are valid ones. They are not, however, logically necessary conse-
quences of legalized active euthanasia. Precautions may be taken to
prevent widespread abuses.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A comparison of the euthanasia laws in the Netherlands and in the
United States indicates a difference in the particular focus between
countries. In addition, the comparison points to disparities between the
laws in each country and the actual practice of euthanasia. The under-
lying common factor is that in both countries, there exists a tension
between the state's interest in preserving life and an individual's right
of self-determination.235 In the Netherlands, the recognition of an indi-
vidual's right of self-determination has led to the acceptance of eutha-
nasia.2 36 Laxity in enforcing the guidelines under which euthanasia is
permitted, however, has resulted in the denigration of the right of self-
determination for those who have fallen victim to abuses.237
The tension between the state's interest in preserving life and indi-
vidual self-determination is also manifested in euthanasia laws in the
United States. While many states accept the role of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker acting on behalf of an incompetent individual,238 the Su-
preme Court has ruled that a high evidentiary burden may be imposed
prior to allowing the authority of a surrogate decisionmaker. 3 The Su-
preme Court decision in Cruzan has tipped the scale in favor of the
state's interest in preserving life. 240 Similarly, the illegal status of active
euthanasia has placed a restriction on an individual's right of self-de-
termination. This commentary proposes that an individual's right of
self-determination can be maintained without resulting in abuses of le-
galized euthanasia.
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 154-56, 168 (discussing the tension between the state's inter-
est in preserving life and an individual's right to refuse treatment in Cruzan).
236. See supra notes 37-75 and accompanying text (discussing euthanasia in the
Netherlands).
237. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (examining involuntary euthanasia
in the Netherlands).
238. See supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text (discussing state court cases
recognizing the authority of surrogate decisionmakers).
239. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (examining the Cruzan holding).
240. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1990)
(concluding that the state may impose a clear and convincing evidentiary standard
before accepting the determination of a surrogate decisionmaker).
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A. PASSIVE EUTHANASIA
With respect to passive euthanasia, in cases involving incompetent
patients with no prospect of recovery who are being kept alive only
through medical technology, the courts should adhere to the substituted
judgment of family members.2 " Allowing a state to require a high bur-
den of proof to determine what an individual would have wanted jeop-
ardizes the individual's privacy right and right of self-determination. 4 2
Just as the Netherlands has recognized an individual's right of self-
determination in the analogous life and death decision pertaining to
active euthanasia, 243 an individual's right of self-determination would
be similarly acknowledged in passive euthanasia cases by allowing fam-
ily members to exercise the right of an incompetent individual. Such a
personal decision ought to be made by those who know the patient best
and desire what is in the patient's best interest.24 ' The state's interest
in preserving life is not absolute and should not outweigh the choice of
an individual or of a family member acting on the individual's be-
half.2 45 Although the state's interests are important,2 46 the weight af-
forded them ought to be diminished in matters that are inherently pri-
vate in nature.247
B. ACTIVE EUTHANASIA
Legalizing active euthanasia would serve to recognize both an indi-
vidual's right of privacy248 and self-determination. 2 9 Active euthanasia
must be strictly controlled, however, because of the possibility that its
legalization will lead to the types of abuses that have occurred in the
Netherlands. One possible abuse includes laxity in enforcing euthanasia
guidelines. A result of this type of abuse could be widespread euthana-
241. See supra notes 163-68, 173-75 and accompanying text (advocating the au-
thority of decisionmakers acting on behalf of incompetent patients).
242. See supra note 183 (asserting that an incompetent person's right to privacy is
destroyed by not recognizing the authority of surrogate decisionmakers).
243. See supra notes 27, 62, 72 and accompanying text (discussing the right of
self-determination recognized by Dutch courts).
244. See supra notes 164-66 (discussing decisionmaking by family members).
245. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2869 (Brennan. J.,
dissenting).
246. See supra notes 119-41, 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
of state interests).
247. See supra notes 162-66 (asserting that the family setting is the appropriate
context for making private decisions).
248. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional
right to privacy).
249. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (describing the right of self-
determination).
1992] 839
840 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 7:807
sia beyond what is legally permissible.250 Insofar as the threat of invol-
untary euthanasia exists, legalized active euthanasia could result in an
ironic reversal of the right of self-determination for some individuals. 25 1
Active euthanasia should be legalized, but it should be performed
only within comprehensive guidelines.2 52 First, there must be an une-
quivocal, persistent, and well-considered consent from a patient who is
in a chronic state of suffering.2 53 Second, the request must be in writ-
ing. 254 Third, the physician must determine that there is no prospect for
recovery.255 Fourth, the individual must weigh alternative options.256
Fifth, a physician must offer carefully monitored assistance.2 57 Finally,
the physician must obtain the opinion of at least one colleague.25 8 The
guidelines include objectively verifiable criteria, 25 including a written
request and a medical determination that the patient has no hope for
250. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (discussing abuses of
euthanasia).
251. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (asserting that involuntary euthana-
sia has been a result of allowing voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands).
252. See, e.g., supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing guidelines pro-
posed by the Dutch Medical Association and the Nurses' Union).
253. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing the analogous re-
quirements set forth by the Leeuwarden court). The first criterion, which requires
chronic suffering and an incurable illness, ensures both that the individual has no possi-
bility of improvement through medical treatment and that the suffering is severe. See
also Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 439; supra note 41 and accompanying text (describ-
ing Leeuwarden requirement that the doctor must have determined that the dying
phase had set in). This requirement further safeguards against temporary wishes to die
by providing that the individual's request to die be persistent.
254. See Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 439. See also supra notes 40, 48 and ac-
companying text (noting that the Leeuwarden court decision required a written re-
quest). The second requirement provides an objective means of verifying the patient's
request. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 472 (asserting that a written request is objec-
tively verifiable).
255. See supra notes 38, 41 and accompanying text (describing Leeuwarden crite-
ria that the patient must have an incurable illness and the dying phase must have set
in).
256. See supra note 55 (describing the requirement by the Dutch Medical Associa-
tion and the Nurses' Union that alternatives must be considered).
257. See Leeuwarden, supra note 9, at 439; see also note 42 and accompanying
text (describing the Leeuwarden requirement that a doctor must assist euthanasia).
The fifth requirement reinforces the concept that euthanasia is a last resort to be un-
dertaken only within a medically-supervised environment.
258. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines that the
Dutch courts have adopted since 1984, requiring that a doctor consult a colleague).
The final requirement serves to protect both the physician and the patient. See gener-
ally de Wachter, supra note 50, at 3317 (discussing the advantages of having a physi-
cian consult with a colleague). The patient obtains a second opinion regarding the
chances of recovery, while the physician is protected against potential liability for giv-
ing an incorrect diagnosis. Id.
259. See Bostrom, supra note 32, at 472 (discussing criteria that are objectively
verifiable); but see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing Dutch Medi-
cal Association guidelines, which do not include objectively verifiable criteria).
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recovery. Since the guidelines are relatively detailed, a federal statute
incorporating them, together with legislative history explaining the in-
tent of the law, would likely be the most effective form of legalization.
The most important aspect of allowing active euthanasia is to enforce
the guidelines strictly and consistently in order to reduce the possibility
of abuse. This may be accomplished by establishing an agency through
which all physicians, subject to approval, must register each case prior
to assisting the patient's death. Both members of the medical profession
and government representatives would have positions in the agency.
The membership of government representatives would ensure that the
legislation was properly executed. The appropriate punishment for a
physician who is discovered violating the regulations could be a long
prison sentence. In addition, a system of internal monitoring within the
profession would constitute an additional safeguard against abuses.260
A physician who reports a colleague who is later found to have violated
the law would receive some type of benefit, such as a tax credit or a
reduction in malpractice insurance.
Such a system could prevent the possible problems of widespread eu-
thanasia being used in inappropriate circumstances, as the Netherlands
has experienced. If the Netherlands strictly enforced its own judicial
guidelines, the right of self-determination of all individuals would be
better served because involuntary euthanasia would be more effectively
prevented. Although the enforcement of any law is not without difficul-
ties, if the guidelines are strictly enforced, problems will be minimal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Netherlands and the United States focus on different
aspects of euthanasia, both countries confront a dilemma concerning
where to draw the boundary between honoring the state's interest in
preserving life and an individual's right of self-determination. An anal-
ysis of the euthanasia experience in the Netherlands provides a helpful
basis for determining what might be a useful agenda for legalized ac-
tive euthanasia. To maintain an individual's rights of self-determina-
tion and privacy without engendering abuses, active euthanasia should
be legalized and monitored through strictly enforced guidelines. With
regard to passive euthanasia, an individual's privacy right and right of
self-determination can best be maintained when family members are
260. See generally de Wachter, supra note 50, at 3317 (suggesting that the legal
requirements of euthanasia will be met if a colleague has knowledge of another physi-
cian's euthanasia case).
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permitted to make life and death decisions on behalf of a family mem-
ber who is unable to do so.
